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Abstract
During the sovereign debt crisis, many Euro countries have deployed “austerity
packages” implementing structural reforms and cutting government spending. Such
policies should have led to an initial decline in GDP followed by recovery and a reduc-
tion of the debt to gdp ratio. Key to this outcome is the size and sign of expenditure
multipliers when the economy is in a recession. We estimate, for the Eurozone coun-
tries, expenditure multipliers in recession and expansion using the linear projection
approach and forecast errors to identify exogenous expenditure shocks. The empir-
ical evidence suggests that, in a recession, an increase in government spending will be
effective in boosting aggregate demand, crowding-in private consumption in the short-
to-medium run, without raising the debt to gdp ratio but rather decreasing it. The
opposite applies in expansions. Estimates also show that expenditure multipliers, in
a recession, are larger in high debt/defict countries than in low debt/deficit countries.
In a recession, fiscal consolidation based on expenditure cuts would have both short
and medium run contractionary effects.
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1 Introduction
The burst of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent recession have revived a heated
debate in policy circles and academic research on whether countercyclical fiscal policy is
effective in stimulating private activity during times of financial stress. After the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 all advanced countries adopted fiscal stimulus in
an attempt to speed up recovery.
The beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, in early 2010, with the associated mounting
tensions in the sovereign debt markets have pushed many Euro area Countries to take
action in an attempt to reduce fiscal imbalances and keep the credibility of their sovereign
debt, by reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. As Blanchard and Leigh (2013, p.1)
wrote, “some policy-makers claimed that confidence effects associated with fiscal consol-
idation could overwhelm direct contractionary effects, leading to small or even negative
multipliers”, which implies that fiscal consolidation may not hamper growth and may
actually be expansionary (see for example Giavazzi, Pagano, 1990, 1996, popularised by
Alesina, 2010, and accepted by the then president of the ECB Jean Claude Trichet, 2010).
However, in the countries that have undergone significant, and unprecedented, efforts to
reduce fiscal imbalances, “austerity” measure did not result in a reduction in the debt-
to-GDP ratio whereas output, employment, consumption and investment resulted weaker
than expected or even their rates of change turned out to be negative. Actual fiscal
multipliers were larger than expected when front loaded fiscal consolidation plans were
implemented (especially in the Eurozone) and, most of all, had the standard Keynesian
sign (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).
In a series of path-breaking contributions, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013)
estimated government spending multipliers for a panel of OECD countries on semi-annual
frequency. Their findings reinvigorated the old Keynesian tenet that spending multipliers
are positive and larger in recessions than in expansion, which implies that fiscal consol-
idations implemented in a recession have a stronger contractionary impact than in an
expansion. Conversely, an increase in government spending is likely to have larger ex-
pansionary effects in recessions than in expansions as in a recession monetary policy may
keep the interest rate very low whilst inflation is subdued, which implies that an addi-
tional aggregate demand will trigger higher real output growth and lower price increases.
Building on Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013) and subsequent studies, our paper
aims at contributing to the debate on the effects of fiscal consolidation by focussing on
the Eurozone countries.
We will empirically assess the macroeconomic benefits and costs of increasing govern-
ment spending in EZ-countries at a time of financial distress and recession. It is therefore
critical to determine which macroeconomic impact government spending and its compos-
ition have not only on GDP but also on private consumption and private investment and
on the “health” of a country’s public finances as measured by the deficit-to-GDP ratio, the
debt-to-GDP ratio and the primary surplus during different phases of the business cycle,
in order to provide a guidance for future stabilization strategies if new deep recessionary
episodes were to be faced.
An array of relevant policy issues are addressed by extending the analysis in a number
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of ways. It is a common view that an increase in public expenditure may negatively
affect the current account balance, by directly increasing imports and indirectly decreasing
exports because of a higher labour costs (proxied by real wages) and/or export prices. We
also enquire whether differences in initial macroeconomic conditions across EZ countries
affect the size of multipliers. It may be expected that countries affected by high interest
rate spreads will experience lower effectiveness of a public spending expansion, as the
high spread will make the expansion short lived as soon as the boundaries of public debt
sustainability are met. For the same reason expanding public expenditure in countries
with a low fiscal space is regarded as being little output effective. To settle this issue we
directly estimate expenditure multipliers in high public debt and low public debt countries
(once again in recessions and in expansions).
We also test the traditional open economy macroeconomics tenet that multipliers are
negatively related to the degree of openness to trade, and are lower under a free-floating
exchange rate than under exchange rate pegging. To this purpose we interpret the Euro-
zone as a peg-exchange rate area (Corsetti et al. (2012)). Finally we tackle the supposed
singularity of the Great Recession. More precisely we answer the question: were expendit-
ure multipliers markedly different (higher) in the Great recession than in other milder
recessions of the past?
Some of the research questions above have already been addressed in the literature by
means of different econometric models. This to some extent impairs the comparability
of the results. In the present paper we approach all research questions within a unified
econometric framework based on local projections, as suggested by Jorda´ (2005). In
order to gauge the unanticipated government spending shock Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012, 2013) use the forecast error, that is the difference between the actual growth rate
of government spending and the forecast growth rate prepared by professional forecasters.
We employ the same measure of an expenditure shock in analysing the experience of 12
Eurozone countries over thirty years (1985-2015) and follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013) in using direct projections rather than the SVAR approach to estimate multipliers
in order to economize on the degrees of freedom and to relax the assumptions on impulse
response functions imposed by the SVAR method.
We find that increases in government expenditure in recessions have a marked expan-
sionary effect on output and employment, do not “crowd out” private consumption and
private investment, and are beneficial on public debt and deficit, whilst impacts on infla-
tion are negligible and statistically non significant. Expansionary effects are independent
of the initial “fiscal space”. It actually turns out that a positive unexpected public ex-
penditure shock, in a recession, is more expansionary in high public debt countries than
in low debt countries. In a recession, fiscal expansions do not lead to higher public debt
to GDP ratios in the medium run, i.e., anti-cyclical fiscal policies prove to be compatible
with “debt sustainability”. Moreover, we find that in times of recession, countries that are
less open to trade, or that are in a fixed exchange regime or display a high public deficit
show higher government spending multipliers than those estimated for countries with a
high degree of openness to trade, a flexible exchange rate regime and low deficit (as the
simple Mundell-Fleming model predicts).
Expansionary fiscal consolidation in recessions is at variance with our empirical results.
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In short: our findings support the view that “the boom, not the slump, is the right time
for austerity at the Treasury” (Keynes, 1937).
The paper is organized as a follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant empirical literature
on fiscal multipliers. Section 3 introduces the data and the econometric methodology
employed. Sections 4 and 5 present the main results. Section 6 develops and presents
some robustness check and sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 The debate around fiscal multipliers
There are two distinct methods to derive fiscal multipliers: one is based on empirical
estimation, the other one is model-based. The empirical estimation strand is mainly
focused on the advanced economies, with the largest number of studies devoted to the US.
The model-based approach has been applied to many different countries, usually changing
the models’ assumptions. In the empirical literature the size of the government spending
multipliers range from negative values to positive values as high as 4. The main question
is why estimates vary so widely.
Different approaches may contribute part of the explanation. The seminal paper of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) explores this issue in the context of a structural vector-
autoregressive model (SVAR), which relies on the existence of a one-quarter lag between
output response and fiscal impulse. The Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification
strategy has been debated by Ramey (2011), Forni and Gambetti (2010) and others.
Ramey (2011) pointed out that what is an orthogonal shock for a SVAR may not be
such for private forecasters. Forni and Gambetti (2010) shows evidence that government-
spending shocks are non-fundamental for the variables typically considered in standard
closed-economy specifications (“fiscal foresight”). This implies that VAR models compris-
ing these variables are unable to consistently estimate the shock.
These findings confirm the result obtained in Ramey (2011) that the fiscal policy
shock estimated with a VAR as in Perotti (2007) is predicted by the forecast of government
spending from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Briefly, there seems to be, at least for
the US, a meaningful correlation among orthogonal shocks in a SVAR and private forecasts.
In order to fix this, Barro and Redlick (2011) and Romer and Romer (2010) have suggested
the use of a “natural experiment approach” or a narrative approach. Barro and Redlick
(2011) uses the military spending as shocks, Romer and Romer (2010) identifies exogenous
tax changes from the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional
reports.
An additional explanation for differing estimates is that the fiscal multiplier may de-
pend on several characteristics of the economy as its degree of openness, the exchange
rate regime, and the state of the business cycle. Economic theory suggests that fiscal
multipliers may be larger in recession because of a milder “crowding out” of private con-
sumption and investment due to less responsive prices, a constrained reaction of nominal
interest rates due to the zero-lower bound (Eggertsson, 2011; Eggertsson Mehrotra, Rob-
bins, 2017), an higher return from public spending due to countercyclical financial frictions
and credit constraints (Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, Diba, (2015)) and lower crowding out of
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private employment due to a milder increase in labour market tightness (Gorodnichenko,
Mendoza, Tesar, (2012)).
Several authors provide empirical evidence in favour of state-dependent fiscal multi-
pliers. Tagkalakis (2008) studies how private consumption responds to fiscal shocks when
the economy is in recession or expansion in the presence of liquidity constrained agents.
Tagkalakis (2008) finds that both tax and spending shocks affect consumption changes
more in bad times than in good times in OECD countries and especially in those featuring
financially constrained individuals. This entails that some degree of fiscal flexibility could
be helpful in economic downturns, in particular in those countries where people have a
limited access to credit. Batini, Callegari, and Melina (2012) use regime-switching VARs
to estimate the impact of fiscal adjustment in the United States, Europe and Japan al-
lowing for fiscal multipliers to vary across recessions and booms. The main finding is that
smooth and gradual consolidations are to be preferred to front-loaded consolidations, es-
pecially in recession economies facing high-risk premia on public debt, because sheltering
growth is key to the success of fiscal consolidation in these cases. Bachman and Sims
(2012), using a standard structural VAR and a non-linear VAR, investigates if confidence
is an important channel by which government spending shock affect economic activity.
They find that the endogenous response of confidence explains almost the entire output
stimulus in a recession, whereas its role in normal times is only minor. However, the pos-
itive response of output and productivity to a government spending shock during times of
slack is mild on impact, gradual and prolonged. The authors argue that fiscal stimulus in
recessions has a different impact than in normal times or during booms. Indeed, spending
shocks during downturns predict productivity improvements through a persistent increase
in government investment relative to consumption, which is reflected in higher confidence.
Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (2014) investigates the asymmetric effects of government
spending on U.S. output by means of a threshold structural vector autoregressive model.
The empirical investigations present a strong evidence in favour of non-linear, state-
dependent effects of fiscal policy. Fazzari et al. (2014) shows that government spending
raises output, but this effect is both larger and more persistent when capacity utilization
is low. Although stimulus policy may increase government debt, the effect is smaller than
a simple calculation would suggest because higher government spending raises output, in-
come, and therefore tax revenues, and the effect of spending stimulus on public debt is less
than one dollar for a dollar. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) estimates government
purchase multipliers for a large number of OECD countries, allowing these multipliers to
vary smoothly according to the state of the economy and using real-time forecast data
to get policy shocks which are purged of their predictable components. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013) use direct projections rather than the SVAR approach to estimate
multipliers in order to economize on the degrees of freedom and to relax the assumptions
on impulse response functions imposed by the SVAR method. They find large differences
in the size of spending multipliers in recessions and expansions with fiscal policy being
considerably more effective in recessions than in expansions. The results of the paper
suggest that fiscal policy activism may indeed be effective at stimulating output during
a deep recession, and that the potential negative side effects of fiscal stimulus, such as
increased inflation, are less likely under these circumstances.
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These empirical results call into question the results from the standard new Keyne-
sian literature, which suggests that shocks to government spending, even when increasing
output, will “crowd out” private investment, at least to some extent (Woodford, 2011).
Corsetti, Meier, and Muller (2012) investigates the sensitivity of government spending
multipliers to different economic scenarios. They find fiscal multipliers to be particularly
high in the aftermath of a financial crisis. Rossi and Zubairy (2011) and Canova and Pappa
(2011) show that fiscal multipliers tend to be larger when positive spending shocks are
accompanied by a decline in the real interest rate. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) emphasize
that during the “Great Recession” the size of fiscal multipliers was underestimated by
the IMF and other institutions. This once more suggests that fiscal multipliers may vary
over the business cycle. Indeed, the literature focused on the linear effects of a tax or
government spending shock on output on a single country (i.e., Pereira and Wemans,
(2013); Hayo and Uhl, (2014); Cloyne, (2013)), and particularly on the US economy
(i.e., Blanchard and Perotti, (2002); Mountford and Uhlig, (2009); Romer and Romer,
(2010); Favero and Giavazzi, (2012); Perotti, (2012); Mertens and Ravn, (2014)), whereas
a few studies have focused on a cross-country panel datasets (see e.g., Guajardo, Leigh,
and Pescatori, (2011)) or on multi-country analysis (i.e., Be´nassy-Que´re´ and Cimadomo,
(2012)).
The literature focusing on the non-linear effects of government spending is scant espe-
cially as for the Euro area. This paper tries to fill this gap by estimating the non-linear
effect of a government spending shock on key macroeconomic variables (i.e., GDP, private
consumption, private investment) and on some public finance indicators (i.e., debt to GDP,
deficit to GDP).
In a unified econometric framework (local projections, Jorda´, 2005) we investigate
whether the size of the different multipliers vary based on macroeconomic characteristics
of the countries considered in the analysis (Euro Countries).
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
Our sample comprises 12 Euro Countries.1 The macroeconomic variables come from the
OECD’s Statistics and Projections database.2
We use semi-annual frequencies for our macroeconomic variables such as government
spending. As mentioned above, in addition to real GDP we examine responses of other
macroeconomic variables to government spending shocks: real private consumption, real
private gross capital formation, real exports and imports.
Second, we analyse the reaction of labour market variables such as total employment,
employment in the private sector, the unemployment rate and the real compensation per
worker in the private sector.
1The countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The sample covers the 1985-2015 period.
2We are grateful to Alan Auerbach who shared with us his database from 1960 to 2010.
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Third, we investigate the responses of the variables which are key to sustainability of
public finance: deficit-to-GDP, Debt-to-GDP and the Primary surplus.
Finally, we examine how prices, calculated by the consumer price index (CPI), the
consumer price index harmonized (CPIH) and the GDP deflator, react to government
spending shocks. All the variables except the unemployment rate, deficit-to-GDP, Debt-
to-GDP and Primary surplus are in logs.
3.2 Methodology
We follow the single-equation approach advocated by Jorda´ (2005) and Stock and Watson
(2007), which does not impose the dynamic restriction that are present in the SVAR
methodology and is able to accommodate non-linearities in the response function.
As shown in Jorda´ (2005) the advantages of local projections with respect to standard
VAR are numerous: 1) local projections can be estimated by simple regression technique,
2) local projections are more robust to misspecification, 3) joint or point-wise analytic
inference is simple and, 4) local projections easily accommodate experimentation with
highly non-linear specifications. When we use GDP of country i as the dependent variable,
the response of Yi at the horizon h is estimated by using the following regression:
Yi,t+h = αi + µt + F (zi,t)ΠR,h(L)Yi,t−1 + (1− F (zi,t))ΠE,h(L)Yi,t−1+
F (zi,t)ΨR,h(L)Gi,t−1 + (1− F (zi,t))ΨE,h(L)Gi,t−1+
F (zi,t)ΦR,h(L)FE
G
i,t + (1− F (zi,t))ΦE,h(L)FEGi,t + ui,t
(1)
with : F (zi,t) =
exp(−γzi,t)
(1 + exp(−γzi,t)) , γ > 0 (2)
where i and t index countries and time, αi is the country fixed effect, µt is the time
fixed effect, Gi,t−1 is the log of real government purchases3. Following Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013), we adopt a measure of the business cycle state which is not affected
by the well known difficulties in estimating potential output and the output gap. F (·) is
the transition function for each country in the sample with the range between 0 (strong
expansion) and 1 (deepest recession), zi,t
4 is a variable measuring the state of the business
cycle, which is based on the deviation of the 1.5 years moving average of the output growth
rate. The advantages of using the 1.5 years moving average for zi,t are numerous: one is
that we can use the full sample for estimation and this allows us not to miss observations
and our estimates will be as precise and robust as possible. The zi,t is normalized such that
E(zi,t) = 0 and V ar(zi,t) = 1 for each i. Moreover, we allow the trend to be time-varying
inasmuch some countries show low frequency variations in the output growth rate. For
3Government consumption + Government investment.
4where zi is the deviation from the output growth rate calculated as the moving average over 1.5
years from its potential trend, normalized by the standard deviation of the output growth rate; i.e. zi
= (output growth rate)-(trend output growth rate)
standard deviation of output growth rate
.
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this reason, we use the HP filter5 to extract the trend with a high smoothing parameter
λ = 10, 000.
In this framework FEGi,t can be read as the surprise government shock. It is the forecast
error for the growth rate in the forecast prepared by professional forecasters at time t-1 for
time t.6 We control FEGi,t for the information contained in the lags of Y and G to purify
any predictable component from the dynamic effects of output and the effects of past
government spending changes. We include FEGi,t dated by time t because it is consistent
with the recursive ordering of government expenditure first as in Cholesky decompositions
in the VARs. Moreover, using FEGi,t as the surprise government shock we overcome two
factors that are often criticized in the literature.
First, using forecast errors we eliminate the problem of “fiscal foresight” (Ramey
(2010); Corsetti and Muller (2011); Forni and Gambetti (2010); Leeper et al. (2013);
Zeev and Pappa (2014) and others).7
Second, we minimize the likelihood that estimates capture the potentially endogenous
response of fiscal policy to the business cycle due to automatic stabilizers.8
The lag polynomials {ΠR,h(L),ΨR,h(L),ΠE,h(L),ΨE,h(L)} are used to control for the
history of shocks. The impulse response function dynamics are constructed by varying the
horizon h of the Y. In other words, the impulse response function dynamic is estimated by
{ΦE,h(L)}Hh=0 for expansion and {ΦR,h(L)}Hh=0 for recession. The direct projection allows
to construct the impulse response function as a moving average of the series under scru-
tiny where the lag polynomial terms control for initial conditions and the {ΦE,h(L)}Hh=0
and {ΦR,h(L)}Hh=0 describe the reaction of the economic system to a structural exogenous
shock. In practice, we regress our variable of interest Yi for each time t+h on an unanti-
cipated shock at time t and thus we obtain the average response of the dependent variable
h periods after the shock which is precisely the definition of an impulse response.
This estimation method has several advantages. First, it involves only linear estima-
tion, if one fixes (as we have throughout our work) the parameter γ in expression (2).
Second, it obviates the need to estimate the equations for dependent variables other
than the variable of interest (i.e., GDP) and thus economize on the number of estimated
parameters.
Third, it does not constrain the shape of the impulse response function, rather then
imposing the pattern achieved by the SVAR.
5We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to separate a time series into trend and cyclical components. The
trend component may contain a deterministic or a stochastic trend. The smoothing parameter determines
the periods of the stochastic cycles that drive the stationary cyclical component.
6It is the difference between the actual and forecast series of the government spending (Government
Consumption + Government Investment).
7Fiscal foresight is the phenomenon that legislative and implementation lags ensure that private agents
receive clear signals about the tax rates they face in the future and it is intrinsic to the tax policy process.
Fiscal foresight produces equilibrium time series with a non-invertible moving average component, which
misaligns the agents’ and the econometricians’ information sets in estimated VARs (Leeper (2008)).
8In the STVAR or standard VAR analysis of how government spending shocks affect the economy, the
impulse response is constructed in two steps. First, the contemporaneous responses are derived from a
Cholesky decomposition. Second, the propagation of the responses over time is obtained by using estimated
coefficients in the lag polynomials. The direct projection method effectively combines these two steps into
one.
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Fourth, the error term in equation (1) is likely to be correlated across countries.
Hence,it would be particularly hard to handle it in the context of nonlinear STVARs
but it can be easily addressed in a linear estimation by using Newey-West (1987) standard
errors, Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors or clustering standard errors by time period.9
Fifth, we can use specification (1) to construct impulse responses for any macroeco-
nomic variable of interest as we are not constrained by the VAR’s curse of dimensionality.
Finally, because the set of regressors in specification (1) does not vary with the time hori-
zon h, the impulse response incorporates the average transitions of the economy from one
state to another, this means that we do not have two separate models when z changes. If
the spending shock has an effect on the state of the economy, this effect is absorbed within
the polynomial {ΦE,h(L)}Hh=0 and {ΦR,h(L)}Hh=0 (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013)).
Finally, the linear specification can be found as a special case of (1), where the response
of the dependent variable is constrained to be the same over the business cycle (zi,t); i.e.
ΠLin,h(L) = ΠE,h(L) = ΠR,h(L); ΨLin,h(L) = ΨE,h(L) = ΨR,h(L); ΦLin,h(L) = ΦE,h(L) =
ΦR,h(L) for all L and h.
Yi,t+h = αi,h + ΠLin,h(L)Yi,t−1 + ΨLin,h(L)Gi,t−1 + ΦLin,h(L)FEGi,t + ui,t (3)
4 Multipliers: estimation
4.1 GDP, employment, real wages and prices
We first establish the result that multipliers in the Eurozone are widely different across
regimes: i.e., they are much higher in recessions than in expansions, whether GDP or
employment is considered as the dependent variable. Real wages and unit labour costs
are unaffected by shocks to public expenditure both in recessions and in expansions.
In this and the following section the Panels show the impulse responses of our macroe-
conomic variables of interest to one percent increase in the government spending shock.10
In each panel there are two sub-panels showing the response (black, thick line) in reces-
sion11 and expansion.12 The thin, dashed lines indicate the 90% confidence bands which
are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors that provide consistent estimates
when there is autocorrelation in addition to possible heteroskedasticity of the error term
in specification (1). In each sub-panel the response of the linear specification (3) (thin red
line) is reported together with the associated 90% confidence bands (shaded region) which
are also based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
[Insert Figure 1]
9To overcome this issue, we re-estimate the model using the FGLS estimator. The findings do not
change. We do not show the results in the paper but they are available from the corresponding author
upon request.
10All the responses are normalized. We scale all responses so that government spending moves by one
percent to a shock in FEGi,t.
11F is near 1 and the response is given by { ΦR,h(L) }Hh=0.
12F is near 0 and the response is given by { ΦE,h(L) }Hh=0.
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Panel 1 shows the GDP responses. In the linear model, the response is near zero
and not statistically significant. The GDP response in recession (Panel 1a) is positive
and statistically significant for all periods (approximately 2.5 years). The maximum size
of the government multiplier is about 2 with 90% confidence interval being (0-3.52). The
average multiplier is about 1.68. The GDP response during expansions (Panel 1b) is
quite different. In the first two years the GDP responses to an unexpected increase in
government spending is near zero and not statistical significant. Conversely, after 2.5
years the response becomes negative (about -0.8) and statistically significant. The result
is broadly consistent with the estimates reported in the recent literature that explores the
state-dependence of fiscal multipliers, where the multipliers are approximately zero during
expansion and about 1-4 in recession.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a, 2013, 2014) estimates that the spending mul-
tiplier in recession (in expansion) is approximately 0.5 (0) for the OECD countries, 1.7
(-0.2) for US and 2.4 (1.2) for Japan. Batini et al. (2012) estimates a spending multiplier
of 2.08 (0.82); Baum et al. (2012) of 1.22 (0.72), Hernandez de Cos and Moral-Benito
(2013) of 1.3 (0.6); Owyang, Ramey, Zubairy (2013) of 0.8 (0.7) for the USA and 1.6
(0.4) for Canada. Vegh et al.(2015) estimates a spending multiplier of 2.3 in recession
compared to 1.3 expansion, while in extreme recessions, the long-run spending multiplier
reaches 3.1. Vegh et al.(2015) estimates that the linear spending multiplier varies between
0.2 - 1.2. For the Euro Area, the linear model predicts a multiplier near zero. Hence,
the linear model underestimates the fiscal multiplier in recessions and overestimates it in
expansions.
It should be stressed that our spending shock are the forecast errors of the professionals
forecaster and through this we remove any systematic correlation pattern between GDP
growth and government spending if there is any. Also, we do not find an economically
significant correlation across the FEGi,t and the state of business cycle F (zi,t). This means
that in either regime a contractionary or expansionary government spending shock is
equally probable. It is thus unlikely that the results are induced by some singularity of
the government spending shock (i.e., automatic stabilizer during a downturn).
Panel 2 and 3 present the impact of a government spending shock on total employ-
ment and the unemployment rate. During recessions, the increase in government spending
is followed by an increase in total employment (Panel 2a). The total employment increase
is statistically significant after 1.5 year (before that, the responses is positive but not stat-
istically significant) and it reaches its maximum after two years (the max response of total
employment is 2.02).
Consistent with the response of total employment, the unemployment rate decreases
when an expansionary fiscal policy is implemented in the midst of a recession. The impact
on the unemployment rate becomes statistical significant with a one year lag from the
government spending shock (Panel 3a). Vice versa, the response of total employment
and the unemployment rate to a government spending shock in expansion is generally
negative and statistically different from zero (Panel 3b).
Further, we investigate the effects on real wages of an increase in public spending during
expansion and recession (Panel 4a, 4b). We find that real wages remain unchanged in
response to government spending shocks both when the economy is in recession and when
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it is in expansion. Also the economy wide unit labour cost (Panel 5a, 5b) is unaffected
by government spending positive shocks taking place in recession. The results of panels
4-5 are consistent with the traditional (old) Keynesian view, according to which wages are
broadly sticky both upwards and downwards when unemployment is high.
4.2 Public debt and deficit
A commonly held tenet is that an increase in public spending, even in a recession, neg-
atively affects the debt and deficit to GDP ratios. As these are the crucial ratios under
scrutiny by the so-called “bond vigilantes”, it has often been argued by central bankers
and policy makers that an expenditure expansion is hindered, even in a recession, by the
need to preserve public debt sustainability. During the European sovereign debt crisis
most peripheral high debt euro countries have been forced to implement a strong fiscal
consolidation, in order not to lose their access to the bonds market. TINA (There is no
alternative) arguments were commonplace for the fiscal consolidation policy.
[Insert Figure 2]
Our empirical evidence casts doubts on such policy prescriptions. During a recession,
an increase in government spending does not imply neither an increase in debt-to-GDP
ratio (Panel 6a) nor in surplus/deficit to GDP (Panel 7a). Rather, we find that an
increase in government spending in recessions leads to a decrease in the debt to GDP ratio
and to an improvement of the deficit to GDP after about two years. Moreover, an increase
in government spending leads to an improvement of the primary surplus after two years
from the shock (Panel 8a).13 However, when the economy is in expansion either debt
to GDP (Panel 6b), the deficit to GDP (Panel 7b) and primary surplus (Panel 8b)
deteriorate, which is consistent with many results found in the literature (Ilzetzki et al.
(2013); Nickel and Tudyka (2013); Abiad, Furceri and Topolova (2015)).
These results give support to the view that, in recessions, public expenditure shocks
boost output more than they add to deficit and debt, meaning that “fiscal stimulus in a
weak economy can improve fiscal sustainability”, as shown by Auerbach, Gorodnichenko
(2017) and suggesting that fiscal consolidation should not be implemented in the midst
of a recession and should better be rescheduled at a time when recovery is on track. The
TINA argument for fiscal consolidation is not supported.
4.3 Components of aggregate demand
As for the transmission channels of fiscal expansions in a recession, we find that private
consumption reacts positively and strongly to the stimulus, whilst the impact on private
investment, export, imports and prices are only week or not statistically significant.
[Insert Figure 3]
13See De Long and Summers (2012) for a tentative explanation of these “unorthodox” effects of public
expenditure on deficits and debt.
11
The effects of an increase in government purchases on private consumption are strongly
countercyclical. Panel 9b exhibits that private consumption, after a fiscal stimulus, is
decreasing in expansions (there is a “crowding out” effect) and increasing in recessions
(Panel 9a). Considering one euro increase in government spending in recessions may
increase private consumption up to 2.5 euro with a 90% confidence interval (0-4.40). Fur-
thermore, the linear model shows that an increase in government spending is not equivalent
to an increase in private consumption. Vice versa, considering expansions, the “crowding
out” effect of private consumption is present (the mean response in expansion is -1.15).
Panel 10 presents the estimated effects of a government spending shock on private
investment. Over three years, a unit increase in government spending shock increases
private investment in recession by 4 euro (but is not statistical significant, (Panel 10a)
and decreases it during expansion by 6 euro (Panel 10b). The joint considerations of
Panel 9 and 10 suggests that the stimulus of an increased public spending in recession
is more effective through increased private consumption than through increased private
investment, that is the supply effect seems not to be statistically significant. Instead,
an increased public expenditure in expansion “crowds out” consumption and private in-
vestment as the standard New-Keynesian model predicts. The linear model points out
that private investment decreases after a government spending shocks, but it is statistical
significant only in the short run (1-2 years).
Panels 11 and 12 exhibit the response of real exports and imports. We do not find
a robust reaction of these variables to government spending shocks. Only the response of
exports are statistical significant across regimes. During recession the effect is negative
(Panel 11a), while during expansion the response is positive (Panel 11b) consistently
with the opposite effects on internal demand. Vice versa the response of imports are not
statistically significant in both regimes: recession (Panel 12a) and expansion (Panel
12b).
Finally, Panels 13, 14 and 15 present the reactions of prices measured by the Con-
sumer price index (CPI), the Harmonized Consumer price index (HCPI) and the GDP
deflator. Generally, we find that an increase in government spending leads to minor in-
flationary effects during a recession and deflationary effects during an expansion. The
result for prices in expansions is surprising. It should be noted that according to standard
theory a stronger positive price response should be expected during expansions than in a
recession. However, the multiplier is statistical different from zero only for the Consumer
Price Index (Panel 13a, 13b).
[Insert Figure 4]
4.4 Does public spending composition matter?
In 2004 the European Commission wrote: “For the countries with high deficits, the budget-
ary consolidation strategy, based on expenditure restraint, should not be achieved at the
expenses of the most “productive” components of public spending (such as public invest-
ment, education and research expenditures).” (European Commission (2004), p. 28). In
the theoretical literature it is usually maintained that an increase in government invest-
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ment has a greater impact on GDP than an increase in government consumption of the
same size (i.e., Baxter and King (1993), Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2003)).
In the long run, the superiority of public investment seems hard to refute on theoretical
grounds. As F. Skidelsky (2001) stresses, government investment is considered the most
powerful policy instrument as it combines the short-run support of an aggregate demand
boost with the long-term supply-side benefits. In standard models government investment
expenditure has all the effects of government consumption, plus a positive externality on
the productivity of private inputs. Hence, the “Golden Rule” of public finance states
that government should borrow only for investment and not for consumption, as invest-
ment pays, through future tax gains accruing from the increased capital stock (see e.g.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004)).
Additionally, the “Golden Rule” allows potentially socially worthwhile investment op-
portunities to be undertaken, without violating the “sustainability” of the public budget.
A strand of the literature uses VAR model to estimates the effects of public investment
(i.e., Perotti (2004), Ilzetzki et al.(2013)). Ilzetzki et al. (2013) finds that the multiplier of
government investment in developing countries is positive and larger than one in the long
run (2-3 years). This suggests that the composition of expenditure may play an important
role in assessing the effect of fiscal stimulus in developing countries consistent with the
findings of Perotti (2004). Abiad, Furceri and Topolova (2015) find that increased public
investment rises output, “crowds in” private investment and reduces unemployment.
Moreover, when the economy is in a recession and monetary policy is accommodating,
demand effects are stronger and the public debt to GDP ratio may decline after an increase
in public investment. In the empirical literature there seems to be an agreement that
public investment is likely to have stronger positive growth effects than public consumption
(Nijkamp and Poot(2004), Gechert (2014, 2015) and Abiad, Furceri and Topolova (2015)).
In this section of the paper, we explore whether the multiplier of government investments
is indeed larger than that of government consumption. To examine the role of spending
composition, we estimate the following specification:
Yi,t+h = αi + µi + F (zi,t)ΠR,h(L)Yi,t−1 + (1− F (zi,t))ΠE,h(L)Yi,t−1+
F (zi,t)ΨR,h(L)Gi,t−1 + (1− F (zi,t))ΨE,h(L)Gi,t−1+
F (zi,t)ΦR,h(L)FE
j
i,t + (1− F (zi,t))ΦE,h(L)FEji,t + +ui,t
(4)
where FEji,t= is equal to FE
C
i,t
14 or FEIi,t
15
with : F (zi,t) =
exp(−γzi,t)
(1 + exp(−γzi,t)) , γ > 0 (5)
One again we focus on the Euro Area countries from 1985 to 2015. Panels (16-18)
show the results of consumption and investment spending shocks on output, the debt to
14Forecast error of Government Consumption.
15Forecast error of Government Investment, we have data only for 6 Euro Countries: Belgium, Germany,
Finland, France, Italy and Netherlands.
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GDP ratio and on deficit. One again, the result are heterogeneous by regime and spending
composition. Both an increase in government consumption and in government investment
have positive effects on output in recessions and negative in expansions. However, the
output effect of government investment spending is stronger than those of government
consumption spending only in the long run. The multiplier exceeds 4 for investment and
is around 3.20 for consumption. These results are broadly consistent with the findings of
Perotti (2004) and Ilzetzki et al.(2013).
[Insert Figure 5]
Panel 17 shows the effects for investment and consumption spending on the debt to
GDP ratio. A government consumption shock, in recession, reduces the debt to GDP
and the size of consumption multiplier is sizeable (it reaches 8% after 3 years). While
in periods of expansion, the estimates suggest a rise in public debt. A public investment
shock, on the other hand, does not affect the debt to GDP ratio neither in recession nor
in expansion.
Panel 18 exhibits the effects of investment and consumption spending on the deficit.
We find that a one percent increase in public investment does not have relevant effects on
deficit both in recessions and expansions. Vice versa an increase in public consumptions
reduces deficit during economic slack and increases it during economic expansion. During
recession, both public consumption and investment increase private investment in the
medium term and the multipliers reach a size as big as 5 after 3 years, suggesting the
presence of a strong “crowding in” effect.
However, during expansion the opposite happens either for consumption and invest-
ment spending, suggesting the possibility of “crowding out” when the economy is outside
the recession consistent with the findings of Abiad, Furceri and Topolova (2015).16
The results of this section are broadly consistent with the literature confirming that
public investment activated in recessions have both a short run (demand) effect and a long
run (supply or “crowding in”) effect, that combine to deliver high long run multipliers.
5 Multipliers and initial conditions
Initial conditions in which public expenditure shocks take place may affect the size of the
multiplier. The level of public debt (as a share of GDP), the level of the interest rate spread
across countries 17 the degree of openness to trade18, for instance, are widely believed to
influence the effectiveness of a fiscal stimulus. Since there were significant differences in
macroeconomic initial conditions across Euro countries and over time, we can gauge the
correlation between such initial conditions and the size of government spending multipliers
by estimating the following equation:
16The detailed results about consumption and investment expenditure shocks on private investments,
the unemployment rate and on inflation are available upon request.
17The spread is the difference in yield between a government bond and some benchmark bond with the
same maturity. The benchmark used is the 10 years German Bund.
18Openness = (export+import)/GDP, if this proxy for one country is higher than the average, that
country is labelled as “open”.
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Yi,t+h = αi + µi + F (zi,t)ΠR,h(L)Yi,t−1 + (1− F (zi,t))ΠE,h(L)Yi,t−1+
F (zi,t)ΨR,h(L)Gi,t−1 + (1− F (zi,t))ΨE,h(L)Gi,t−1+
F (zi,t)ΦR,h(L)FE
G
i,t + (1− F (zi,t))ΦE,h(L)FEGi,t+
F (zi,t)Φ˜R,h(L)FE
G
i,tIi,t + (1− F (zi,t))Φ˜E,h(L)FEGi,tIi,t + µIi,t + +ui,t
(6)
with : F (zi,t) =
exp(−γzi,t)
(1 + exp(−γzi,t)) , γ > 0 (7)
where Ii,t is the macroeconomic characteristic that we would like to analyse Coefficients
ΦR,h and ΦE,h describe the response of Y to a government spending shock FE
G
i,t when
Ii,t = 0, while (ΦR,h+Φ˜R,h) and (ΦE,h+Φ˜E,h) describe the response of Y to a government
spending shock FEGi,t when Ii,t = 1.
5.1 Are multipliers lower in high debt countries?
A common tenet is that a fiscal stimulus is less effective (fiscal multipliers are lower) in
high public debt countries, as an increase in public expenditure fuels the expectations
of future tax hikes which induce people to save more and spend less. Moreover, if an
expansionary fiscal policy raises the public debt ratio, the risk premium on interest rates
rises, ultimately boosting the cost of borrowing and negatively affecting aggregate demand
(Ilzetzki et al., 2013).
Table 1 reports the mean and the max response of output across countries over three
year. We find that large government debt does not reduce the positive response of output
to a government spending shock in a recession. In detail, when the debt to GDP ratio
is low, a one percent increment in government purchases increases output about 2.42%
over three years. Vice versa, if the level of debt is high, the mean response of output is
2.40%. Indeed, when the level of government debt is low, the max response of output is
3.72 whereas when the level of debt is high the max response is 3.70. The results do not
show any adverse effect of public debt on the size of the fiscal multiplier.
Our estimates show that an increase in government spending during economic down-
turns has a similar effect in countries with low and high public debt over three years.
Conversely, when the economy is in expansion, an increase in government spending has
no effect on GDP for both countries with high or low debt.
Besides the level of debt we investigate whether the presence of a high deficit or of an
interest rate spread in the Eurozone countries affects the size of the spending multiplier.
The empirical results show that an increase in public expenditure in high deficit countries
during recession increases GDP approximately by 2.50%. In contrast, an increase in
government spending in surplus/low deficit countries, has an output response of just 0.26%
and is not statistically significant.19
19The max response in the high deficit countries is 3.83%, whilst for surplus/low deficit countries is
0.77% and is not statistically significant.
15
We have similar results when we consider the spread, i. e. an indicator of relative
financial risk. We find that the spending multiplier associated with an increase in govern-
ment spending when the spread is above 150 basis point is larger than the one associated
with an increase in government spending when the spread is under 150 basis point. In
fact, the spending multiplier for the first case is 1.35 on average and reaches a maximum
of 2.20 after three years. In contrast, the multiplier when the spread is under 150 basis
point is 1.17 on average and reaches a maximum of 1.79 after three years. The Countries
that have experienced a high sovereign risk are Spain (1991-1996), (2010-2014); Finland
(1991-1995); Italy (1991-1996), (2011-2014); Portugal (1991-1996), (2010-2015); Belgium
(2010) and Ireland (2010-2013). The results show that a stimulus to public spending, in
downturns, is more effective to rise GDP in high risk countries than in “safe” countries.
The joint consideration of deficit and spread cases in Table 1 suggests that the stim-
ulus effect of an increased government spending in recession is more effective in high
deficit/spread countries than in low deficit/debt countries.20
The results of this section, joint with the negligible impact of public expenditure in-
creases on the public debt/GDP ratio in recessions (section 4.2), cast doubts on the view
that there was no alternative for high debt euro area countries but to go for fiscal consolid-
ation in the midst of the 2011-2013 recession. The robustness of these results is confirmed
by several tests. We have proved that an initial large public debt or an initial large public
deficit or an initial wide spread do not reduce and actually enhance the response of private
consumption, private investment and employment to a government spending shock.21
[Insert Table 1]
5.2 Multipliers in more and less open economies
Ilzetki et al. (2013) showed that the government spending multiplier is higher in closed
economies than in open economies, which is consistent with the standard Macroeconomics
literature. We find evidence that supports this prediction during recession. We show
(Table 1) that for both open and closed economies22 the mean and max response of output
to a government spending shock is sizeable The size of government spending multiplier
is higher for a closed economy, a one percent increase of government spending increases
output of about 1.73%; in contrast for a open economy the mean response is as low as
1.09%.23
Corsetti et al. (2010, 2012) investigates whether the exchange rate regime determines
the size of the fiscal multiplier. In the traditional Mundell-Fleming model, government
spending is ineffective at stimulating domestic demand under flexible exchange rates be-
cause a fiscal expansion “crowds out” net exports as a consequence of the exchange rate
20That means that a boost to aggregate demand (particularly for more risky countries ) will help to
speed up the recovery.
21Detailed results are available in the Appendix, Tables A1-A4.
22The degree of openness is proxied by the ratio (export+import)/GDP. If for a country this ratio is
higher than the average value for the sample countries, that country is “open”. Vice versa the country is
“closed” if the above ratio is lower than the average value.
23The maximum response for a closed economy is 3.12% whilst for an open economy is 1.75%.
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appreciation. In contrast, under fixed exchange rates, fiscal policy becomes effective be-
cause the exchange rate appreciation is immediately offset through monetary expansion.
Since the European Monetary Union can be proxied by a fixed exchange rates regime
as for the member countries, it is relevant to investigate whether the spending multiplier
is higher in fixed exchange rate regime than in a flexible exchange rate regime. We show
evidence that support this prediction. Under fixed exchange rates regime, a one percent
increase in government spending during economic slack raises output by approximately
1.87%. In sharp contrast, under a fully flexible exchange rate regime (1985-1998) the
response of output in recession is never significantly different from zero. The same results
apply if one checks for the impact of the interaction between government spending increases
and trade openness on private consumption, private investment and employment.24
5.3 Is the fiscal multiplier time varying?
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) emphasizes that during the “Great Recession” the size of fiscal
multipliers has been underestimated. In order to investigate whether the Great Recession
is different from previous recessions as regards the size of fiscal multipliers, we re-estimate
the baseline formulation of model (1) for two sub-samples: pre-crisis (1985-2006) and
crisis (2007-2105). In the (2007-2015) period the nominal interest rate in the Eurozone
has been close to the zero lower bound. Panels 19-20 show the impulse responses of
two macroeconomic variables (GDP and debt-GDP) to a one percent positive shock to
government spending25. As usual, in each panel, there are two sub-panels showing the
response (black, thick line for Recession and red, thick line for Expansion) in the two sub-
periods (panel (a) before the Great Recession, panel (b) during the Great Recession). The
thin dashed lines indicate the 80% confidence bands which are based on Newey and West
(1987) standard errors that provide consistent estimates when there is autocorrelation in
addition to possible heteroskedasticity of the error term in specification (1).26 Panel 19
shows that the spending multiplier is higher and statistically significant over the 3 years
horizon in the period following the global financial crisis (Panel 19b, in recession). On
the other hand, before the Great Recession, the spending multiplier reached its maximum
after one year (2.24) and it became not statistical significant after the first year (Panel
19a, in recession). Conversely, when we consider the expansionary regime, the responses
are quite analogous in both sub-samples The GDP response to an unexpected increase in
government spending is negative but not statistically significant, before 2007 (Panel 19a),
and it is near zero after 2007 (Panel 19b). Panel 20 presents the effect of an increase
in government spending on the debt to GDP ratio. We control the effect of government
spending shock on the debt to GDP ratio in order to account for the effect of a spending
shock on the public budget. Panel 20b shows that an increase in government spending
24Once again detailed results are available in the Internet Appendix, Tables A1-A4.
25We only show the results for the GDP and debt-GDP. The findings are similar when we consider
other macroeconomic variables, such as: private consumption, private investment, deficits; the results are
available on request.
26The choice to increase the confidence interval is due to the fact that the observations in the sub-samples
are fewer than in the total sample.
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leads to a decrease in the debt to GDP ratio over a 3 years’ horizon in the period following
the Great Recession (2007-2015, in recession).
Before the outbreak of the crisis the effect of government spending on the debt to GDP
ratio is strikingly different. An unexpected increase in government spending deteriorates
the debt to GDP ratio over the 3 years’ horizon (Panel 20a, in recession). It is noteworthy
that the debt multiplier follows a bell-shaped curve. The debt multiplier remains lower
than one for about one year and a half; the second year it reaches its maximum (1.27) and
then after the second year, it drops below one. Therefore, it is interesting to note, that
it is true that an increase in government expenditure initially may deteriorate the debt
to GDP ratio, however, the multiplier is almost always less than one (no multiplicative
effect). Vice versa, in an expansionary regime, the impulse responses are quite similar in
both sub-samples A government spending shock leads to an increase in the debt to GDP
ratio both before 2007 and during the crisis (2007-2015).
[Insert Figure 6]
The results of this section confirm the exceptionality of the 2007-2015 crisis as com-
pared to ordinary recessions in the period 1985-2006. The effectiveness of expansionary
public spending shocks is magnified in the recent crisis years. Also, the effects of a public
spending shock on the debt to GDP ratio proved to be different in the crisis years from
what they used to be in more “normal” times. It may be observed that the Eurozone was
actually close to the zero lower bound (ZLB) of nominal interest rates since 201127 and that
at the ZLB expansionary fiscal policies show enhanced effectiveness as the negative effect
of interest rate increases in the face of expansionary (and potentially inflationary) fiscal
policies are ruled out.28 To further investigate this issue we follow Miyamoto, Nguyen,
Sergeyev (2017) and estimate the impact of an unforeseen positive shock to public ex-
penditure respectively in the ZLB years (2011-2015) and in non-ZLB years (1985-2010),
without distinguishing between recession and expansion. Panel 21a shows that a positive
shock in the ZLB years is actually capable of triggering an output recovery. As monetary
policy, in the period 1985-1998, was not in charge of a single central bank in EZ countries,
we also controlled if our result is driven by the non-ECB years. After re-estimating our re-
gressions for the sub-periods 1999-2010 and 2011-2015 we show that results do not change
substantially (Panel 21b). The ZLB time span is short, and some North countries were
already recovering in 2013-2014; hence our estimates should be considered with caution,
and only used to explain why the fiscal multiplier in the Great Recession years are so
much higher than in ordinary recessions.
27https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy and exchange rates/key ecb interest rates/html/ in-
dex.en.html
28Canzonieri et al. (2016), Christiano et al. (2011), Hall (2009), Erceg and Linde´ (2014) and Woodford
(2011) derive in theoretical models fiscal multipliers on output which exceed one at the zero lower bound. In
a different setting Eggertsson, Mehrotra, Robbins (2017) find that increases in government spending at the
ZLB “can carry zero or negative multipliers [...], depending on the distribution of taxes across generations”.
In an empirical investigation concerning Japan Miyamoto, Nguyen, Sergeyev (2017) estimate the effects
of unexpected government spending increases both when the nominal interest rate is near the ZLB and
outside of the ZLB period. They find an output multiplier equal to 1.5 on impact in the ZLB period, while
it is as low as 0.7 outside of the ZLB period.
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[Insert Figure 7]
6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we test the robustness of our findings in 2 ways: 1) we control for different
variables that measure the state of the business cycle; 2) we re-estimate the fiscal multipli-
ers distinguishing between countries with similar public public finance features, splitting
our Eurozone sample into two groups (“South” countries vs “North” countries).
6.1 Is output responses depending on the variables that measure the
state of business cycle?
In the baseline formulation of the empirical model, we use a moving average of the output
growth rate to measure the state of the business cycle in each economy. The key advantage
of using this variable is that the growth rate of output is a coincident indicator. Since
the moving average is computed over 1.5 years and thus is cumulative, it should to some
extent capture the output gap and thus the degree of slack in the economy. One may
want to verify that using other measures of slack yields similar results. We employed
alternative indicators of slack: (a) the de-trended log change in unemployment rate and
(b) the de-trended log unemployment rate. In either case, we de-trend all series making use
of the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ= 10,000. Irrespective of which
measure we use, the response in a recession is larger than the response in expansion.29 We
conclude that cyclical variation in the output responses is robust across different variables
measuring the state of business cycle.
6.2 Southern Countries vs Northern Countries
In section 5.1 we found that an initial high level of public debt and deficit increases the size
of fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone. As in the Eurozone there are two groups of countries
differing as for their ratios of public deficit/debt to GDP and their fiscal space (South
and North countries in short), in order to check the robustness of our findings we followed
Bacchiocchi et al (2011) in re-estimating the baseline empirical model (1) by splitting the
sample into two groups according to the level of public financial liabilities (as a share of
GDP) during the sample period (1985-2015).30 The idea is to analyse whether the high/low
deficit/debt countries are more or less affected by government spending shocks in the dif-
ferent phases of business cycle. The results are shown in the Internet Appendix.31 This
29The response sometimes are marginally statistically significant at 80 percent. Detailed results are
available in the Internet Appendix (Figure A.1) for the GDP and debt-GDP.
30Sample A (South Countries) comprises the GIIPS countries plus Belgium and France, which have
either high debt or high deficit over the entire period. Sample B (North Countries) comprises Austria,
Germany, Finland, Luxembourg and Netherlands. The results discussed below do not change if Greece, as
an obvious outlier, is left out of Sample A.
31We only show the results for the GDP and debt-GDP (Figure A.2). The findings are analogous
even when we consider other macroeconomic variables, such as: private consumption, private investment,
deficits; the results are available upon request.
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robustness check strongly confirms the results obtained in section 5.1. To further invest-
igate the question we also estimated the government multiplier by dropping one country
at a time from the sample. Once again the results remain unchanged: the government
multiplier turns out to be smaller when we drop one of the South countries and higher
when we drop one of the North countries.32 We feel entitled to conclude that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, an expansionary fiscal policy in a recession is more output-effective
in South highly indebted countries than in North low-debt countries.
7 Conclusions
This paper brings together many strands of the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal
policy (and of public expenditure in particular) on different macroeconomic aggregates
in a unified analytical framework, featuring the local projection approach introduced by
Jorda´ (2005) that allows to construct impulse responses for any macroeconomic variable of
interest, whilst being not constrained by the VAR’s restrictions. We focused on unforeseen
government expenditure changes implemented in the Eurozone countries and estimated
the effects of such policies on the key macroeconomic aggregates (GDP, private consump-
tion, private investment), on public finance indicators (deficit, primary balance, debt to
GDP ratio) and allowing the spending multipliers to vary smoothly according to the busi-
ness cycle. This broad picture confirms for the Eurozone countries the existence of large
differences in the size of public expenditure multipliers in recessions and in expansions, as
found by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) for the broader OECD set of countries.
We find that an increase in public expenditure in the Eurozone has a high and positive
multiplier effect on output, provided it is implemented in a recession, while this effect is
negative or no-significant in expansions as predicted by Keynesian theory. Our analysis
also shows that an expansionary fiscal policy in a recession has a strong “crowding in”
effect on private consumption, whilst this crowding in effect on private investment is not
statistically significant unless the policy implemented is surely countercyclical. Our es-
timates also confirm that an expansionary fiscal policy in a recession does not impact on
prices, real wages and unit labour cost, entailing that Eurozone countries could implement
such a policy without deteriorating the price competitiveness of their exports. Counter-
cyclical expansionary policies in a recession prove to be beneficial for the public budget on
a five years horizon: both the deficit/GDP and the debt/GDP ratios would improve after
the expansionary treatment. On the other hand, fiscal consolidations based on spending
cuts, in a recession, prove to be non-expansionary and to raise both deficit and debt to
GDP ratios over a not so short time horizon. The “expansionary austerity” view is not
supported by our empirical results.
The paper further addresses a few highly debated issues concerning expenditure mul-
tipliers in the Eurozone and shows: (i) in a recession fiscal multipliers are higher in high
debt countries than in low debt countries, implying that the absence of “fiscal space”
does not cause the ineffectiveness of expansionary fiscal policies (the reverse in an expan-
sion); (ii) under prevailing fixed exchange rates fiscal multipliers in a recession are greater
32Results are available upon request.
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than under universal flexible exchange rates, implying that being in a monetary union
actually enhances the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policies (the reverse applies in
expansions); (iii) increases in both government consumption and government investment
have positive effects on output in a recession (negative in an expansion). However the
effect of public investment is larger than that of public consumption in the long run (2
years after the shock); (iv) estimated fiscal multipliers were higher in the aftermath of the
2007-8 financial crisis than in previous recessions. This result is possibly associated with
Eurozone experiencing the policy interest rate being near the zero lower bound during the
recent prolonged recession/stagnation. All these results survive several robustness checks.
Jeffrey Frankel said in 2014 conference, “what is the best fiscal policy, Austerity or
Stimulus? The question is as foolish as the question ‘should a driver turn left or right?’
It depends where he is in the road. Sometimes left is the answer, sometimes right”. The
empirical analysis carried out in this paper suggests that, under all respects, when the Euro
countries are “in recession road” the correct answer is Stimulus, when the Euro countries
are in “expansion road” the correct answer is Austerity. From our findings one may say
that the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis was not the right time to implement a fiscal
consolidation in many Eurozone countries.
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Appendices
Table 1: Variation in the mean response of output across countries, control for time and
country fixed effects
Response when characteristic is equal to zero Response when characteristic is equal to one
Mean Response Max Response Mean Response Max Response
Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2)
Level of Government Debt 2.42*** -0.88 3.72*** 0.23 2.40*** -0.87 3.69*** 0.24
(0.87) (0.83) (1.01) (0.24) (0.85) (0.82) (0.99) (0.24)
Surplus/Deficit 0.26 0.28 0.77 0.90** 2.50*** -1.64*** 3.83*** -0.04
(0.51) (0.39) (1.00) (0.46) (0.66) (0.65) (1.23) (0.17)
Spread 1.17*** -0.30 1.79*** 0.33*** 1.35*** -0.58 2.20*** 0.32
(0.49) (0.29) (0.74) (0.14) (0.40) (0.56) (0.84) (0.25)
Openness 1.73*** -1.15*** 3.12*** 0.02 1.09** 0.03 1.75** 0.73***
(0.52) (0.46) (0.84) (0.15) (0.52) (0.25) (0.84) (0.31)
Currency Union -0.86 0.26 -0.27 0.46 1.87*** -0.43 3.19** 0.53
(0.74) (0.37) (0.24) (0.65) (0.62) (0.46) (1.39) (0.63)
Zero lower bound 1.20*** -0.63*** 1.74*** 0.10 0.98 2.87*** 1.85 7.29**
(0.37) (0.27) (0.50) (0.09) (1.27) (0.72) (2.41) (3.26)
Notes: The table reports estimate of equation (3). Level of government debt is measured as a percent of
GDP (Source: OECD). Surplus/Deficit is measured as a percent of GDP (Source: OECD). Spread is the
difference in yield between a bond and some comparative benchmark bond. In this case the benchmark
is the 10 years German Bund vs other Euro Countries Government bond with the same maturity(Source:
OECD). Openness to trade is measured as (export+import)/GDP, if the proxy for one country is higher
than the average, the economy is open vice versa is not (Source: OECD). Currency Union is a dummy that
takes the value 1 after the introductions of the euro. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Table A.1: Variation in the mean response of private consumption across countries, control
for time and country fixed effects
Response when characteristic is equal to zero Response when characteristic is equal to one
Mean Response Max Response Mean Response Max Response
Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2)
Level of Government Debt 2.25* -1.16* 2.77** -0.56* 2.24* -1.16* 2.76** -0.56*
(1.31) (0.63) (1.26) (0.32) (1.29) (0.62) (1.24) (0.32)
Surplus/Deficit 0.87 -0.65* 1.47 -0.27 2.93*** -2.08*** 3.82*** -0.61*
(0.99) (0.38) (1.32) (0.32) (0.98) (0.72) (1.18) (0.35)
Spread 1.07 -0.49 1.46 -0.19 2.02*** -2.07*** 2.90*** -0.71***
(0.74) (0.36) (0.96) (0.34) (0.72) (0.40) (1.08) (0.30)
Openness 2.27** -1.55** 3.16*** -0.49* 1.62** -1.00*** 2.47*** -0.39
(1.00) (0.68) (1.24) (0.30) (0.72) (0.32) (0.97) (0.29)
Currency Union -0.69** 0.15 0.17 0.87 2.85*** -2.37*** 4.68*** -0.79***
(0.30) (0.26) (0.64) (0.59) (0.79) (0.50) (1.32) (0.31)
Notes: The table reports estimate of equation (3). Level of government debt is measured as a percent of
GDP (Source: OECD). Surplus/Deficit is measured as a percent of GDP (Source: OECD). Spread is the
difference in yield between a bond and some comparative benchmark bond. In this case the benchmark
is the 10 years German Bund vs other Euro Countries Government bond with the same maturity(Source:
OECD). Openness to trade is measured as (export+import)/GDP, if the proxy for one country is higher
than the average, the economy is open vice versa is not (Source: OECD). Currency Union is a dummy that
takes the value 1 after the introductions of the euro. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Table A.2: Variation in the mean response of Private investment across countries, control
for time and country fixed effects
Response when characteristic is equal to zero Response when characteristic is equal to one
Mean Response Max Response Mean Response Max Response
Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2)
Level of Government Debt 4.84*** -6.58** 9.24*** -0.70 4.78*** -6.47** 9.11*** -0.69
(1.81) (2.91) (1.58) (1.71) (1.78) (2.86) (1.55) (1.68)
Surplus/Deficit 0.80 -1.75* 2.60* -0.04 4.76** -1.43 7.47*** 2.16
(0.81) (0.97) (1.39) (0.89) (2.42) (1.42) (3.09) (2.31)
Spread 4.22*** -2.88** 6.26*** -0.23 2.96*** -1.11 4.78*** 2.18
(1.52) (1.39) (2.00) (1.15) (1.19) (2.25) (1.87) (3.91)
Openness -0.12 0.23 1.12 0.86 4.17*** -2.73*** 5.38*** -0.68
(1.55) (0.78) (1.18) (1.26) (1.44) (0.93) (2.01) (1.03)
Currency Union 4.28*** -2.71*** 9.01*** 0.51 2.35 -1.47 5.11** 2.85***
(1.19) (1.01) (2.32) (1.26) (1.55) (1.42) (2.48) (1.19)
Notes: The table reports estimate of equation (3). Level of government debt is measured as a percent of
GDP (Source: OECD). Surplus/Deficit is measured as a percent of GDP (Source: OECD). Spread is the
difference in yield between a bond and some comparative benchmark bond. In this case the benchmark
is the 10 years German Bund vs other Euro Countries Government bond with the same maturity(Source:
OECD). Openness to trade is measured as (export+import)/GDP, if the proxy for one country is higher
than the average, the economy is open vice versa is not (Source: OECD). Currency Union is a dummy that
takes the value 1 after the introductions of the euro. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Table A.3: Variation in the mean response of Debt to GDP across countries, control for
time and country fixed effects
Response when characteristic is equal to zero Response when characteristic is equal to one
Mean Response Max Response Mean Response Max Response
Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2)
Openness -1.53 1.95** -0.98** 2.69 -1.80*** 1.48*** -0.04 3.73***
(1.56) (1.01) (0.49) (1.73) (0.72) (0.29) (0.36) (0.72)
Currency Union 0.27 1.08* 0.95 2.00* -2.01** 1.79*** -0.42 5.27***
(1.61) (0.65) (0.97) (1.15) (0.95) (0.43) (0.35) (1.30)
Spread -1.04 0.75 0.15 2.39*** -1.81*** 2.85*** -0.32 5.51***
(1.08) (0.46) (0.41) (0.91) (0.71) (0.39) (0.28) (0.89)
Notes: The table reports estimate of equation (3). Level of government debt is measured as a percent of
GDP (Source: OECD). Surplus/Deficit is measured as a percent of GDP (Source: OECD). Spread is the
difference in yield between a bond and some comparative benchmark bond. In this case the benchmark is
the 10 years German Bund vs other Euro Countries Government bond with the same maturity(Source:
OECD). Openness to trade is measured as (export+import)/GDP, if the proxy for one country is higher
than the average, the economy is open vice versa is not (Source: OECD). Currency Union is a dummy
that takes the value 1 after the introductions of the euro. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Table A.4: Variation in the mean response of Total employment across countries, control
for time and country fixed effects
Response when characteristic is equal to zero Response when characteristic is equal to one
Mean Response Max Response Mean Response Max Response
Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2) Recession (1) Expansion (2)
Level of Government Debt 1.30 -4.02*** 5.02*** -0.44 1.28 -3.97*** 4.96*** -0.43
(2.27) (0.75) (1.70) (0.45) (2.25) (0.74) (1.68) (0.44)
Surplus/Deficit -0.13 -1.73*** 1.07 -0.08 1.84* -1.57*** 2.66** -0.21
(0.44) (0.41) (0.87) (0.16) (1.03) (0.67) (1.20) (0.24)
Spread 1.03 -2.13*** 2.55** -0.21 0.98* -1.05** 1.96*** 0.16
(0.87) (0.57) (1.21) (0.25) (0.56) (0.53) (0.57) (0.34)
Openness 0.06 -0.38 0.42 0.18 1.22 -2.58*** 2.64*** -0.46**
(0.43) (0.49) (0.64) (0.21) (0.83) (0.50) (1.13) (0.21)
Currency Union 1.60*** -2.52*** 4.01*** -0.53*** 0.65 -1.04** 1.33* 0.06
(0.54) (0.49) (1.21) (0.22) (0.67) (0.51) (0.76) (0.20)
Notes: The table reports estimate of equation (3). Level of government debt is measured as a percent of
GDP (Source: OECD). Surplus/Deficit is measured as a percent of GDP (Source: OECD). Spread is the
difference in yield between a bond and some comparative benchmark bond. In this case the benchmark is
the 10 years German Bund vs other Euro Countries Government bond with the same maturity(Source:
OECD). Openness to trade is measured as (export+import)/GDP, if the proxy for one country is higher
than the average, the economy is open vice versa is not (Source: OECD). Currency Union is a dummy
that takes the value 1 after the introductions of the euro. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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